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Breaking the deadlock on the Banking Union: stakes and priority needs for European banks

Day 2 Morning

Thursday 17 September

Location :

ROOM 2

Speakers

Public Authorities
John Berrigan
Director General - DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, European Commission
Oliver Gilvarry
Assistant Secretary General with Responsibility for Banking - Department of Finance, Ireland
Dominique Laboureix
Chair - Single Resolution Board (SRB)
Peter Palus
Member of the EFC/EWG & Head of Financial Unit - Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic to EU
Oliver Schütz
Managing Director, Resolution & Enforcement and Law - Austrian Financial Market Authority
Industry Representatives
Francesco Correale
Head of Group Regulatory Affairs - UniCredit S.p.A.
Karolin Schriever
Executive Member of the Board - Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV)
Johanneke Weitjens
Global Head of Supervision, Public & Regulatory Affairs - ING Group
Expert
Rimantas Šadžius
Former Minister of Finance of Lithuania, Former Member of the European Court of Auditors

Session overview

Objectives

As long as the Banking Union remains incomplete and its institutional framework is not sufficient to ensure its effectiveness, progress towards a simpler regulatory framework, a more competitive European banking sector and a more integrated banking market is likely to remain constrained. The central question is therefore no longer whether these reforms should be pursued, but whether they can be successfully delivered without first overcoming the Banking Union deadlock.

The first objective of the session is to assess whether the Banking Union has become the enabling condition for delivering the European Union's wider banking agenda, as suggested by the Commission's Communication on competitiveness. The discussion should explore whether, regulatory simplification, proportionality, a better implementation of international prudential standards and greater market integration can realistically be achieved while the institutional deadlock of the Banking Union persists.

The second objective is to explore what comprehensive political agreement could credibly break the Banking Union deadlock. Rather than considering individual reforms in isolation, the discussion should assess whether a balanced package build on a holistic approach  combining stronger common safeguards, freedom for cross-border banking groups to manage capital and liquidity, a renewed deposit insurance architecture, enhanced crisis-management arrangements and a credible proportionality agenda for smaller institutions could restore trust among Member States and create the conditions for deeper financial integration while preserving financial stability.

Points of discussion

  1. Which institutional obstacles continue to prevent genuinely European banking groups from operating efficiently across borders, and to what extent do these obstacles explain the persistence of the Banking Union deadlock?

  2. What comprehensive political package could credibly break the Banking Union deadlock while addressing the legitimate concerns of all Member States?