Speakers
Session overview
Objectives
The first objective of the session is to identify where the interaction between the microprudential, macroprudential and resolution frameworks creates the greatest complexity relative to the prudential benefits delivered, and where simplification should therefore be prioritised. The discussion will examine how regulatory and supervisory simplification can improve transparency, predictability, competitiveness and financing capacity while preserving financial resilience. It will also assess which reforms can be delivered through supervisory practices or Level 2/Level 3 measures, and which require Level 1 legislation, as well as which of the Commission's announced measures should be prioritised in the high-impact reform package due in Q1 2027.
The second objective is to examine the structural conditions needed to make simplification both effective and durable. The discussion will assess the respective roles of Banking Union integration, proportionate rule-making and better regulatory governance in reducing complexity for different types of banks. It will also explore how the EU can ensure a more holistic assessment of the prudential framework over time, strengthen responsibility for monitoring its cumulative coherence, and prevent future legislation, supervision and technical standards from recreating unnecessary complexity.
Points of discussion
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How should the cumulative interaction between the microprudential, macroprudential and resolution frameworks be simplified without weakening financial resilience?
Which elements of the prudential framework should be prioritised for simplification to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden while preserving prudential benefits, and which banks and activities would benefit most?
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To what extent can the EU banking regulatory and supervisory framework be meaningfully simplified without deeper Banking Union integration and stronger regulatory governance?
Who should be accountable for maintaining a holistic view of the EU prudential framework and preventing overlaps across microprudential, macroprudential and resolution requirements? Would assigning this responsibility to a single institution be more effective than adding further coordination mechanisms?