The EU framework has been seriously reinforced over the last decade, in particular for large banks, but there remains room for improvement and harmonisation to reach a crisis management framework effective for all types of banks, including small and medium-sized ones. The variety of approaches followed by national authorities notably in the management of failing mid-sized banks in recent years generated obvious mistrust between Member States, which is one of the obstacles to completing the Banking Union.
The recent collapse of three regional US banks (Silicon Valley Bank, Silvergate Bank Signature bank), which did not comply with enhanced prudential standards and associated supervisory rigour (stress testing, liquidity and interest rate risk management for example) following legislation put forward in 2018, reminds us that medium sized banks can be systemic. Crisis events also shows the importance of resolution strategies that rapidly reassure depositors and minimize disruption.
The session will draw lessons from the collapse of the US regional banks and the takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS for the EU crisis management framework. Then the panel will focus on how to address the funding gap in resolution notably for small and medium sized banks whether or not they are under the remit of the SSM and SRB.
Points of discussion
- What lessons can be drawn from the collapse of the US regional banks and the takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS for the EU’s crisis management framework?
- What are the main regulatory and supervisory priorities to improve the EU resolution framework for medium sized banks?
How to ensure in particular that a common definition of the Public Interest Assessment (PIA) is applied uniformly in all EU countries and notably for medium-sized banks which are not under the remit of the SRB? What should be the appropriate level of MRELs for medium-sized banks with positive PIA to support the implementation of their resolution strategy? How to address the funding gap in resolution of medium sized banks? What role for Deposit Guarantee Schemes? What are the expected benefits and the drawbacks of reviewing the deposits or the DGS positioning in creditor hierarchies and/or of establishing a general depositor preference rule? What do you think of the Commission’s legislative proposal on these issues?