Speakers
Session overview
Objectives
The EU macroprudential framework has significantly strengthened financial resilience, but its growing complexity and divergent national implementation now raise the challenge of simplifying the framework without undermining risk sensitivity, financial stability or national flexibility.
The objective of this session is to assess how the EU macroprudential framework can be made simpler, more coherent and more usable while preserving the resilience achieved over the past decade. The discussion will first examine the future architecture of macroprudential buffers, including whether the EBA proposal for a single releasable buffer combining the CCyB and the SyRB provides a credible path towards simplification, how the role of the SyRB should evolve, and what safeguards would be needed to ensure that a simplified framework remains proportionate, risk-sensitive and effective in periods of stress.
The session will then examine how the governance of the EU macroprudential framework could evolve to strengthen convergence and improve coherence across macroprudential, supervisory and resolution policies. It will discuss how to distinguish legitimate heterogeneity from unwarranted divergence, whether common methodologies and calibration benchmarks could improve consistency without creating a one-size-fits-all framework, and whether a light EU-level governance mechanism could enhance coordination, transparency and accountability without adding unnecessary complexity.
Points of discussion
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How should the EU redesign its macroprudential buffer architecture to make it simpler, more usable and better targeted. To what extent does the EBA proposal for a single releasable macroprudential buffer provide the right way forward? If the CCyB and SyRB are merged into a single releasable buffer, should there be a maximum calibration level or a formal escalation process beyond certain thresholds?
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How should the governance of the EU macroprudential framework evolve to strengthen convergence, ensure greater coherence across the prudential framework and preserve justified national flexibility and avoiding unnecessary institutional complexity?